Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

The State of Utah v. Guido Alvillar : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Wilkinson; attorney general; attorney for respondent.
Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Alvillar, No. 870035 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/322

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRS;--"
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TH^ STATE OF UTAH
UT7
DO
K F U THE STATE OF UTAH,
50
S70O3S
DOCKET NO. ^ ^ i a i J l t i ^ ^ e e ^ n d e n t ,
.A10
V.

Cas<j> No. 870035-CA

GUIDO ALVILLAR,
Defendant/Appellant.

Category No. 2

BRIEF OP APPELLANT
j£2
Appeal from judgment and sentence|for Theft by Extortion, a
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah (tode Ann. §76-6-406 (1953
as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard S. Moffat,
presiding.
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
333 South Second East
Salt Lak4 City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

wmm^m

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
GUIDO ALVILLAR,

Case No. 870035-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and sentence for Theft by Extortion, a
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-406 (1953
as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard S. Moffat,
presiding.
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

V
I

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

. vi

STATEMENT OF CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT:
POINT:

MR. ALVILLAR'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED TO SERVE THE
MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION WITHOUT RECEIVING
CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE INCARCERATION. . . . .

CONCLUSION

2
8

i.

TABLE OF APTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES CITED
Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. supp. 416 (D.C.N.C. 1971)

5

Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51 (Wyo. 1985)

7

Pearce v. North Carolina, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,
23 L.#d. 2d 656 (1969)

3, 4, 5

Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash 1974)

5, 6

State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d 1212 (Wash. 1983) . .

5

State v. Winning, 531 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1975)

4, 5

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-104 (1953 as amended)

7

Utah Code Ann. §76-4-406 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1953 as amended)

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
U.S. Constitution Amendment V

2, 3, 5, 6

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12

2

OTHER AUTHORITIES USED
ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures, Standard 18 - 4.7 (Approved Draft 1968,
1982 Supp

8

Model Penal Code §7.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). . . .

8

ii.

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
§76-1-104.

Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended):

76-1-104, Purposes and principles of construction. The
provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance
with these general purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is
without fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the
seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition or
differences in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders.
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons
accused or convicted of offenses.
§76-3-204 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended):
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.—
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be
sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor/ for a term not
exceeding one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding six months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding ninety days.
U.S. Constitution Amendment V:
AMENDMENT V
. . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . .

iii.

Utah Constitution at I, §12:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons].

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not
be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.

iv.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann,
§78-2a-3(2)(e) whereby a defendant in a district court criminal
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final
judgment of conviction of any crime other than a first degree or
capital felony.

In this case, Appellant was convicted by a jury of

Theft by Extortion, a Class A Misdemeanor.

The Honorable Richard

Moffat, Judge,Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction.
Addendum A)

v.

(See

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Was Appellant entitled to receive credit for time served
while awaiting trial and sentencing where Appellant was held without
bail and subsequently sentenced to serve the maximum sentence
allowed by statute in addition to the nine month period of
presentence incarceration?

vi.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

GUIDO ALVILLAR,

:

Case No. 870035-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against
Guido Alvillar for Theft by Extortion, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-406 (1953 as amended).

A jury

found Appellant guilty on December 1, 1986 in the Third District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

The trial court sentenced Mr.

Alvillar on December 31, 1986 to the maximum term of one year at the
Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah State Prison without giving Mr.
Alvillar credit for the nine month period of presentence
incarceration which he served.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A jury convicted Mr. Alvillar of Theft by Extortion, a
Class A misdemeanor, for an incident which occurred on or about
March 31, 1986 (T. 3). At the time the incident occurred, Mr.
Alvillar was on parole from the Utah State Prison (T. 5).
From the date of the incident until the date of sentencing
nine months later, Mr. Alvillar was held without bail at the Utah

State Prison (T. 5). He was held on the charges in this case and on
a parole hold based on a single allegation that the criminal conduct
charged in the present case constituted a violation of his parole
(T. 7 ) . Mr, Alvillar did not appear before the Board of Pardons for
a revocation hearing during this nine month period (R. 127). At the
sentencing hearing. Judge Moffat sentenced Mr. Alvillar to the
maximum statutorily allowable jail term of twelve months. Mr.
Alvillar was not given credit for the nine month presentence time
served (T. 13).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Where Appellant was held without bail for nine months on
the charges involved in the present case and the only other hold was
a parole hold based on a single allegation involving the conduct
charged in this case, the trial court erred in imposing the maximum
statutory sentence and not giving appellant credit for the
presentence time served.

Such sentence violated Mr. Alvillar's

rights against multiple punishment as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

MR. ALVILLARfS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED TO THE MAXIMUM
TERM OF INCARCERATION WITHOUT RECEIVING
CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE INCARCERATION.

Mr. Alvillar contends that the trial court's sentence,
which failed to credit the period of presentence incarceration,
constitutes double punishment for the same offense and therefore

- 2 -

violates his constitutional rights.

The double jeopardy clause of

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I
§12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah prohibit multiple
punishment for the same offense.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1953 as

amended) establishes that a person who has been convicted of a Class
A misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year.

Because Mr. Alvillar's nine month presentence

incarceration resulted from his alleged commission of theft by
extortion this nine month period of incarceration constitutes
punishment for that misdemeanor.

The twelve month sentence imposed

by the court, when added to the time already served by Mr. Alvillar/
exceeds the maximum allowable sentence.

Consequently, that sentence

violates the Constitutional prohibition against multiple punishment
for the same offense.
In Pearce v. North Carolina, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) the United
States Supreme Court established that the imposition of two prison
terms for the same crime violates the constitutional guarantee
against multiple punishments as provided by the Fifth Amendment
double jeopardy clause.

In Pearce, the defendant had been convicted

of assault with intent to commit rape and was sentenced to prison
for twelve to fifteen years.

Several years later, the Supreme Court

of North Carolina reversed the conviction.

Pearce was retried,

convicted and sentenced to an eight year prison term which, when
added to the time he had already spent in prison, amounted to a
longer sentence than originally imposed.

The United States Supreme

Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against multiple
punishments for the same offense "absolutely requires that
- 3
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punishment already enacted must be fully credited in imposing
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense."

Id. at

718-719.
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a
defendant should be granted credit for pretrial time served in State
v. Winning/ 531 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1975).

In that case, the defendant

was unable to post bail and spent seventy days in jail prior to
pleading guilty to a Class A misdemeanor.

The trial court sentenced

the defendant to serve one year in jail/ the statutory maximum for a
Class A misdemeanor, and did not give him credit for the period of
pretrial incarceration.

The Utah Supreme Court refused defendant's

request that he be granted credit for the seventy days pretrial
incarceration.

The refusal to grant credit was based on the Utah

Supreme Court's view that the Pearce double jeopardy rationale was
inapplicable to the fact situation in Winning.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated "(i)n the case before usf the defendant is awaiting
trial and disposition of his case rather than undergoing
punishment"

State v. Winning, supra/ at 1303.

By so holding, the

Utah Supreme Court based its decision on the view that pretrial
inceration is not punishment.

The holding in Winning goes against

the clear weight of authority and should be overruled.
In the case of State of Utah v. Danny Richards/ Case No.
20580/ currently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court/ Mr. Richards
was unable to post bond and served seventy five days prior to being
convicted of a Class B misdemeanor.

The judge sentenced Mr.

Richards to serve six months jail, the statutory maximum for a Class
B Misdemeanor/ without giving him credit for the pretrial time he
- 4
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had served.

The Utah Supreme Court granted Mr. Richards' Petition

for Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion to Stay any sentence in
excess of six months , and Mr. Richards was released from jail six
months after his initial arrest and incarceration (See State v.
Richards/ Case No. 20580, Appellant's Brief at p. 2 ) .
In his brief, Richards asked the Utah Supreme Court to
overturn its holding in Winning (State v. Richards, Supreme Court
Case No. 20580, Appellant's Brief at 10).

In response, the State

agreed that assuming the trial court had jurisdiction to give credit
for presentence detention in misdemeanor cases, the Utah Supreme
Court should overrule its holding in State v. Winning, where a
misdemeanant receives the maximum sentence and his presentence
detention is due solely to his indigency.

(See State v. Richards,

Case No. 20580, Respondent's Brief at 7-9).
Several state and federal courts have held that pretrial
incarceration constitutes punishment for Fifth Amendment purposes.
In the North Carolina case of Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416
(D.C.N.C. 1971) a defendant, like Mr. Alvillar, was incarcerated
prior to trial and was later given the statutory maximum sentence.
The District Court applied the Pearce rationale and held that:
Culp shall be given credit for time spent in
custody prior to commitment where he has been
given a maximum sentence. Pre-trial detention is
nothing less than punishment. An unconvicted
accused who is not allowed or cannot raise bail
is deprived of his liberty. (emphasis added)
Id. at 419.

See also Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash 1974);

State v. Phelan, 471 P.2d 1212 (Wash. 1983).

These cases hold that

pretrial incarceration constitutes punishment for Fifth Amendment
purposes.
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Reanier v. Smith/ 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1974) involved the
consolidated applications for writs of habeas corpus of four
defendants who were incarcerated in the state penitentiary.

All

four sought credit against their prison sentences for pretrial
detention.

The Court held that all of the defendants/ one of whom

was confined to the state hospital prior to sentencing, two of whom
were unable to post bail/ and one of whom was denied bail because of
the nature of the charge, were entitled to credit on their terms for
time served in detention prior to trial.

In so holding the

Washington Supreme Court stated:
Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of
discrimination and possible multiple punishment
dictate that an accused person, unable to or
precluded from posting bail or otherwise
procuring his release from confinement prior to
trial should, upon conviction and commitment to a
state penal facility/ be credited. . . with all
time served in detention prior to trial and
sentence. (emphasis added)
JCd. at 951.
In the interest of justice and fairness/ credit for
presentence incarceration should be granted in every case in which a
person is incarcerated prior to his conviction and sentencing
because of an inability to post bail whether the inability is due to
indigency/ the nature of the charge, or a refusal to set bail due to
parole status.

A person who is incarcerated pending trial may be

subjected to indefinite and lengthy periods of detention caused by
delays in the court calendar, scheduling difficulties and
continuances.

An incarcerated person should not be penalized for

those delays.

Upon conviction, that person should be credited with

all of the presentence time served on the charge.

- 6
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One of the general purposes of the criminal code is to
"(p)revent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or
convicted of offenses,"
amended).

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-404 (4) (1953 as

To require any person, simply because he is a parolee, to

serve more time in jail than a non-parolee charged with the same
offense and to not give credit for that time served is precisely the
type of arbitrary and oppressive treatment condemned by this
section.

In the case at hand, the trial court arbitrarily enhanced

the punishment for an offense solely on the basis of Mr. Alvillar's
status as a parolee.

This practice is discriminatory and

fundamentally unfair.
The sentence imposed on Mr. Alvillar was not only unfair
but was also unlawful.

The trial judge abused his discretion by

sentencing Mr.Alvillar to the maximum sentence allowed by law
without giving him credit for presentence time served.

In

jurisdictions where the trial judge has discretion to grant or deny
credit for time served in presentence detention, the Court
nevertheless may not impose a sentence which will result in more
jail time than that authorized by law.
(Wyo. 1985).

Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 establishes twelve months

imprisonment as the maximum sentence allowed for a Class A
Misdemeanor.

Since Mr. Alvillar had served nine months prior to

sentencing, imposition of the maximum twelve month sentence exceeded
that allowed by law and constituted an abuse of discretion.
In addition to case law, other authority supports Mr.
Alvillar's position that imposition of the maximum allowable
sentence without credit for time already served is unlawful.
- 7
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The

American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures/ Standard 18-4.7 (Approved Draft 1968,
1982 Supp.) states:
a) Credit against the maximum term . . . should
be given to a defendant for all time spent in
custody as a result of the criminal charge for
which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result
of the conduct on which such a charge is based.
This should specifically include credit for time
spent in custody prior to trial, (emphasis added).
(Addendum B ) .
This ABA standard is applicable to the case at hand.

Mr.

Alvillar was held on the charges in this case and the parole hold,
both of which resulted from the conduct on which the misdemeanor was
based.

Pursuant to ABA Standard 18-4.7 Mr. Alvillar should be

credited with pre-sentence time served.
Additional non-case law support comes from the Model Penal
Code §7.09(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962) which provides that when
an individual is incarcerated prior to trial and subsequently
sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence he is entitled to full
credit for his pretrial incarceration (Addendum C ) .
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, and any and all
reasons set forth at oral argument, if any there be, Appellant
respectfully requests that this court vacate his sentence and remand
the case to the Third District Court with an order to the District
Court directing it to correct its illegal sentence and give Mr.
Alvillar credit for the nine months presentence incarceration he
served on this case.
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Respectfully submitted this

-2%

^NU^

day of May, 1987.

C • (ikN

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that four copies of theforegoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

7<

day of May, 1987.

Cfiktf
JOAN C. WATT
Afe^rnei' for Appellant
this J^g^

DELIVERED by,
May, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

' ' « " UN ULERK'S OFI
Salt Lake County, Ut<

FILMED

JAN7/6 1987

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH H Dixon

y. Cierk 3rd Qisi

By.
n^^fitv <

THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL

Plaintiff.
vs.

r.e 8 6 - 6Q5

Case No.
Count No.

Aval

JL~

Honorable

6 ?5P)

j£ssLn/\A

Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

fl.

•JfYiMa¥

" iflg£g"™
f>y\A

AAAriAAJ

£*TAh«A 31*

l^£6

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being/no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Bla jury; Dthe court; • plea of guilty; • plea
of no contest; of the offense of ~ T ) w i f
Ifid^
exV)>rfir?U
;
a class A misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentenceand represented by
J A
COJSC>\ ^ f > y ^ - ^ L J L , r and the State being represented by C%ve<X \&LX)tO
, is
now adjudged guilty of the above offense,
°
fSris now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
(M of
13,
months;
Dyrfnd ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
w and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to M
la<?/ cU^amtKfr^ vu
&
APPH
¥ro,
- f w , nkar.K
<q,AAd VaO/J.2, n\% iVw, VI N
*
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
_.
are hereby dismissed.
Dyupon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

JbA V U .

ab 4Vw • LHak ^kdba, V"ris

D Defenaant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Gr Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Gr Commitment shall issue
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney

By .

/*L/H^rTT/?J

Page

~'-L«-L

•Deputy Clerk

OGQll*(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

(Yellow—Jail/Prison/AP&P)

(Pink—Defense)

(Goldenrod—State)

ADDENDUM B

Standard 18*4.7. Credit for pretrial confinement
(a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a
result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is im' posed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.
This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody
prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which
the defendant has been committed.
(b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody under
15. Sftpnnaily ALI. MOOIL PIHAL Coof §305.24 and comment at 129-134 (Tent. Draft
No. 5. 1956).
16. Cooper v. Lockhart. 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369
(4th Gr. 1970). Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C 1974); Norris v. Georgia, 357
F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lawrence v. Blackweil. 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ca. 1969).
17. Stf ABA. turn note 8. §3.5(c) (restricting use of detainers in classification decisions).

18 • 307

18-4.7

Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures

\ a prior sentence if the defendant is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the
same conduct In the case of such a reprosecution, this should
- include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent
in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on
the same conduct
(c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of
the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of
the remaining sentences should be given for all time served since
the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were
based.
(d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on another charge growing out of conduct which occurred
prior to arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum
term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be
given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which
has not been credited against another sentence.
(e) To avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarceration should be automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action
by the sentencing court should be unnecessary. A procedure consistent with this principle is specified in standard 18-6A
(f) The policies of sentencing authorities and those of other
agencies empowered to determine the date oi actual release
should be carefully coordinated in the area of sentencing credit to
achieve consistency of application and the abolition of any distinction between pretrial and posttrial confinement In particular,
where the agency administering early release employs guidelines
to determine the presumptive date of such release, credit for pre' trial confinement should dso be given against such presumptive
term. To the extent that full integration of policies respecting
sentencing credit is not achieved, the sentencing court should
make corresponding adjustments in the sentence it imposes to
ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial receives
full credit therefor.
(g) These standards do not address the question of whether
credit should be given against the maximum term for good conduct
within the correctional institution or for compliance with institutional rules.
18 • 308

Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures

18-4.7

History of Standard
This is original standard 3.6. There are only stylistic changes, except
that paragraph (f) addresses the new context of parole guidelines and
requires the sentencing court to ascertain that consideration similar to
that required here be required of parole authorities, and if it is not, that
compensating adjustments be made in the sentence imposed.
Related Standards
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 10-5.12, 18-6.8
AU, Model Penal Code §7.09
NAC, Corrections 5.8
NCCUSL, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §3-502
Commentary
Background
Under a variety of circumstances, time spent in custody as a result of
criminal conduct does not count against the sentence imposed. This may
occur because no statute exists in the jurisdiction granting a credit for
such presentence confinement,1 because the statute is narrowly drafted
and excludes some types of incarceration,2 because the court is pre1. A1974 ABA survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provide at least partial credit
against the sentence for time spent in jail prior to sentencing; another nine jurisdictions
made the decision discretionary with the trial judge; one state specifically forbade credit;
and another had "no law on the matter." See ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON COIIICTIONAI.
FACUTIIS AND SERVICES, SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PXACTKI 15 (1974). Federal law

provides a comprehensive credit. See IS U.S.G §3568 (1976).
2. Statutes frequently provide that a sentence "shall commence to run upon arrival at
the prison" or shall be for a term of years "in the state penitentiary." See State v. Kennedy,
106 Ariz. 190.472 P.2d 59 (1970); Ex parte Cofield. 42 Ala. App. 344.164 So. 2d 716 (1964).
Other statutes can be read not to give a credit for time spent in a mental hospital for
observation or study prior to sentencing. An ABA survey found only thirty-two statutes
that expressly awarded credit for such incarceration in a mental hospital. SENTENCING
COMPUTATION LAWS AND PtAcncx, supra note 2, at 15. For the constitutional arguments that
such a limited crediting system offends due process and equal protection concepts, see
Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L. J.
1041 (1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre- Trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L
Riv. 523 (1972); Comment, Prisoners Rights and Eaual Protection, 20 AM. U.L Riv. 482 (19701971). See also Parker v. Esteile, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
Special complications arise in the multijurisdictional context. One decision has denied

18 • 309

: 18-4.7

Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures

suxned under local law to have taken such confinement into consideration as long as the sentence imposed plus the period of pretrial confinement did not exceed the maximum authorized sentence,3 or because the
recognized constitutional case law in the circuit requires a credit for
pretrial confinement only where the crime is a "bailable" one.4 Whatever the reason, there is today only partial recognition of the principle
endorsed here that distinctions between pretrial and posttrial confinement should be irrelevant
It is the purpose of this standard to end such technical distinctions by
granting a comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement
attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no
matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, paragraph (a) requires the credit to be offset against both the minimum and
maximum terms imposed, and paragraph (f) seeks to integrate the policies of sentencing and parole authorities so that such confinement will
similarly reduce any presumptive guideline term used by parole authorities.
There are several reasons for this standard's attempt to standardize
practices with respect to sentencing credits. First, and most common, is
that pretrial detention is related to indigency. Thus, to ignore the pretrial incarceration of the indigent offender is to permit discrimination
based on economic status, which, regardless of the extensive debate
a credit against a federal sentence for time spent in state custody pending a thai under
a federal detainer issued with respect to the same federal conviction. See Bruss v. Harris,
479 F.2d 392 (10th Or. 1973). For criticism of this denial, see Note, Bruss v. Harris: No
Fedent Credit for Time Spent in State Custody — The Effect of a Federal Detainer. 1973 UTAH L RSV.
473. Geariy such time is causally related to the federal conviction, but the court held
that the aedit had been exhausted by applying it against the concurrent state sentence.
See note 24 infra. In general, federal courts now give a aedit for time spent in a state
prison under a federal detainer. See O'Connor v. Attorney General, 470 F.2d 732 (5th
Gr. 1972).
3. Compare Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C Gr. 1966); Davis v. Willingham,
415 F.2d 344 (10th Gr. 1969); Holt v. United States, 422 FJd 522 (7th Gr. 1970); Sute
v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 244
A.2d 468 (1966); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). More recent
cases refusing to adopt such a presumption are discussed at note 8 infra.
4. See. e.g.. Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Gr. 1972); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d
1231 (5th Gr. 1976). Although it can be argued that there is no invidious discrimination
involved where aedit is denied for a nonbailable offense, since the rich and the poor are
treated alike, commentators have pointed out that the case for "jail time" credits rests on
other constitutional foundations besides that of equal protection. See Comment, Credit for
Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing. 121 U. PA. L Riv. 1148 (1973).
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over its constitutionality, is unwise and unjust Second, the least drastic
means principle also has an application in this context "Jail time" serves
most recognized penological goals equally well as does prison time, and
in fact is generally understood to represent a qualitatively harsher form
of confinement than prison custody. To fail to credit it thus results in
confinement in excess of the minimum necessary to realize deterrent,
incapacitative, or retributive purposes. A third argument arises when
the issue is whether custody under a prior invalid conviction should be
credited. In principle, the government should have at least a moral
obligation to recompense the offender for time wrongfully served under
an invalid conviction, and it can only make restitution by permitting
such a credit.5 Additionally, to the extent that credit is not awarded
comprehensively for all forms of custody relating to the criminal charge
for which the sentence is imposed, an unfortunate opportunity for
abuse arises. The possibility cannot be wholly ignored that atypical
forms of presentence confinement (such as detention in a psychiatric
institution for observation or treatment) might be themselves used as
a punishment in order ''to manipulate time factors in sentencing/'6
Finally, credit not given for confinement awaiting appeal may result in
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal the conviction.7
Constitutional Developments
Since the first edition, the most important developments concerning
sentence credits involve the constitutional claim that denial of credit for
jail time violates the equal protection clause. A number of circuit court
decisions have accepted this argument,8 although some decisions have
5. A similar position was taken by the National Advisory Commission. See NAC.
CORRECTIONS, commentary at 171. In most situations such a credit will also be constitution*
ally required by North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
6. L FARMER. OBSERVATION AND STUDY 4 (1977). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th

Ox.), cert, denied 421 U.S. 963 (1974).
7. Statutes denying credit pending appeal are collected in Whalen, Resentence Without
Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws. 35 MINN. L REV. 239, 246 n.40 (1951).
Contemporary statutes do not expressly deny credit for time pending appeal, but by
delaying the sentence's commencement until the arrival of the prisoner at the state prison.
they may make possible substantially the same outcome. See SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAKS
AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 19. G. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
8. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006
(1971) (memorandum), remanding to United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971);
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037,1039-1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Ham v. North Carolina, 471
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limited this rule to bailable offenses. The rationale for the latter distinction is that the rich and the poor alike are incarcerated pending trial for
. nonbailabie offenses and thus no discrimination results when credit for
such jail time is denied.9 Neither these standards nor the Pretrial Release
standards approve of this distinction. In essence, such a distinction
legitimizes preventive detention based only on the category of the
offense. Preventive confinement is subject to attack on a variety of other
constitutional theories,10 and its impact should be minimized by recompensing the defendant through a credit against the sentence. Failure
to do so also creates often unjustified disparities between offenders
convicted of bailable and nonbailabie offenses, since the difference in
the gravity of the respective offenses committed by these two classes
may be modest in comparison with the difference in treatment they
thereby receive.
An even more significant limitation on the development of a comprehensive credit for presentence custody is the rule followed in several
circuits that, if the actual sentence imposed plus the period of presentence custody did not exceed the statutory maximum, then a presumption arises that the court gave credit for the presentence time.11 Such a
presumption may occasionally conform with the court's actual intent,
but it is at least equally possible that the court simply overlooked the
presentence custody already served or at least failed to give this question the serious attention it warrants. In any event, recent decisions have
refused to accept this line of reasoning and have held that such a
presumption may not be used to overcome what the courts saw as a
constitutional right.12 These standards have always agreed with this
latter position and so provide in standard 18-6.8 for the automatic
crediting of presentence custody without any inquiry into the court's
probable intent.
The position of the Supreme Court on the constitutional status of jail
time credit is less certain. In McClnnis v. Roysler, the Court upheld a New
F.2d 406 (4th Gr. 1973); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Or. 1971); Wright v.
Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149
(D. Md. 1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C 1971); White v. Cilligan, 351
F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
9. See note 4 supra.
10. See Comment, supra note 4. See also commentary to standard 18-3.2.
11. See cases collected zt note 3 supra.
12. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Faye v. Cray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir.
1976); Parker v. EsteUe, 498 F.2d 625 (Sth Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1974).
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York statute that denied good time credit to state prisoners for time
spent in presentence custody in county jails.13 In so doing, it noted that
since the good time credit system was designed to reflect a prisoner's
performance in prison rehabilitation programs, a rational basis existed
for its denial to presentence custody in county jails that lacked equivalent rehabilitative facilities.
Distinctions, of course, exist between good time and jail time credits.
The latter is a far less important right to the offender because the
offender is generally parole eligible by the point such credits would
require release, and the majority of offenders are released through the
parole process rather than by the expiration of the statutory maximum
less good time credits. In contrast to the issue of jail time that reduces
the minimum period all offenders must serve, good time generally only
becomes applicable if, after an individualized assessment by the parole
agency, the offender has been deemed sufficiently culpable or dangerous
on his or her own merits to require further confinement. Even in this
special context of good time credits, subsequent decisions have distinguished McGinnis on the grounds that the case turned on the unique
character of the New York statute with its special emphasis on rehabilitation.14 An earlier memorandum decision by the Court at least suggests
that where credit against the minimum term is at issue the Court will
be less prepared to accept references to the statutory purposes of
confinement as a permissible basis on which to treat more harshly those
unable to make bail.15 The majority of commentators have also seen
McGinnis as limited in its application and have argued that a constitutional right to credit for presentence custody now exists.16

Statutory Developments
Statutory developments since the first edition still show the same
diversity of approaches with respect to sentencing credits. A 1974 ABA
13. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Gr. 1972), afd- en bane.
470 F.2d 11S2 (1973).
14. Set. e.g.. Berger, Eaual Protection and Criminal Sentencing; Legal and Policy Considerations. 71
Nw. U.L Riv. 29 (1976); Note, Constitutional lam — Sentencing — Withholding Good Time Credit
from Prisoners Awaiting Appeal. 51 TEX. L Rfv. 348 (1973); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State
Criminal Defendant — A Constitutional Retirement. 34 OHIO ST. LJ. 586, 593 n.35 (1973).
15. Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971); for the decision after remand, see
United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d G r . 1971).
16. See sources cited at notes 12 St 14 supra.
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survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provided at least partial credit
against the sentence for time spent in jail before sentencing,17 nine made
the decision discretionary with the trial judge, and only one specifically
forbade such credit.18 Some thirty-two states also gave explicit credit for
time spent in a mental hospital, three others did so by administrative
practice, and six declined to give such credit.19 The computation of the
credit also varies among jurisdictions. Older statutes still provide that
the sentence commences "upon arrival at the prison," and by so focusing on time spent at a specific institution they have been narrowly
interpreted to deny all credits.20 Unfortunately, many jurisdictions that
do grant credit in some form for jail time fail to specify procedures for
its determination or award. Thus, it is judicial case law that establishes
the operative presumption, often in a. way that narrows the statutory
grant.21
Detention Prior to Service of Sentence
The position taken in paragraphs (a) and (b) is codified in 18 U.S.C.
§3568 and has been similarly endorsed by the Brown Commission22 and
the National Advisory Commission.23 This consensus obviates further
explanation of why denial of credit for presentence custody is unfair.
Current federal law, however, does not grant credit for custody under
a different and unrelated charge on which a defendant is arrested and
confined but not convicted, although such confinement occurs after the
commission of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. Paragraph (d) recommends that credit also be awarded in this situation as
well, and the Brown Commission agrees.24 There are several reasons for
17. SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra n o t e 1, at 1 5 .

19. JUL
20. Id. at 15-16. But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th O r . 1972), affi. en banc. 470 F.2d
1182 (1973).
21. See. /./.. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 4 7 2 P.2d 5 9 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden. 4
Md. App. 629, 244 A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. A p p . Fla.
1968).
22.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 3 2 0 5

(1971).
23. N A C CORRECTIONS 5.8; see also N C C U S L , MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS A C T

§3-502.
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2 2 , §3205(3); see also NCCUSL. MODEL SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS ACT § 3 - 5 0 2 ( C ) . Both the Brown Commission and the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act agree, however, that the offender should "not receive credit for the same
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this recommendation. In some instances, the unrelated charge that went
unprosecuted may have served as a kind of holding category, while the
crime for which sentence was actually imposed may have been "the
undisclosed basis for the first arrest/'25 Even if this is not the case,
failure to credit the time served under the offense for which there was
no conviction gives rise to an inequitable forfeiture by the offender.
This also violates the least drastic means principle, since such time
equally well serves any legitimate correctional purpose. Potentially, the
offender is exposed to a label game under which confinement can in
effect be enhanced depending on the characterization placed on some
portion of the presentence custody.
One limit on this recommendation should be made clear: time served
prior to the commission of the instant offense should not be credited,
even if wrongfully served, since this might permit an offender to "bank"
time against a future offense.
As a practical matter, the recommendation in paragraph (d) will seldom interfere with the flexibility accorded sentencing authorities, but
will instead provide assurance that they have given adequate attention
to a relevant factor. The only instance where a mandatory credit for
such "dead time" will legally limit the authority of the sentencing court
will be when such time plus the sentence the court wishes to impose
exceeds the statutory authorized maximum, and it is exactly in such
instances where a forfeiture of the prior time spent incarcerated seems
most inequitable.26 In other situations, the court will still have the
time more than once/' NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CotJtscnoNS ACT, comment to
§3-502. These standards concur, and this is the intent underlying the final clause in
paragraph (d), referring to time "which has not been credited against another sentence/'
However, it should be noted that where multiple sentences are made to run concurrently,
it is certainly not the intent of this standard to award the credit against one of two
concurrent sentences and require its denial against the other. Given the tendency for the
same criminal transaction to violate overlapping statutes {e.g., one proscribing mail fraud
and the other wire fraud), such an absurd interpretation could frequently render the basic
principle of this standard meaningless. But in other situations (such as where the second
prosecution follows the expiration of the first sentence and the criminal conduct leading
to the current sentence occurred prior to the arrest of the first charge), the legitimate
interests of the defendant are amply protected by a single crediting. For a case illustrating
the dangers of a doctrinaire approach to this single crediting rule, set Bruss v. Harris, 479
F.2d 932 (10th Or. 1973) (credit for pretrial state confinement under a federal detainer
denied where such time was credited against a state sentence concurrent with the federal
sentence).
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22. comment to §3205.
26. Cf. Tinin v. United States, 361 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1966); Short v. United States, 344
F.2d 550, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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authority to exceed the recommended guideline range, although its
explanation for such a departure will have to cite plausible factors.
One other aspect of paragraph (a) deserves special emphasis. Oedit
should be awarded in instances where special treatment is imposed, or
special diagnosis required, as a result of the conduct underlying the
criminal charge. The "pending sentence" language would clearly include, for example, any time an offender spends in a diagnostic facility
for the purpose of having a report compiled under a provision like that
suggested in standard 18-5.6. A narrower statutory credit might unfortunately cause the diagnostic facility to be used as a means of extending
short sentences. It is also intended that credit be required if a defendant
is later convicted of an offense on die basis of conduct for which the
defendant has already been committed. Many of the sex offender statutes described in the commentary to standard 18-2.5 would permit the
criminal prosecution to proceed and a normal sentence to be imposed
after the defendant has been released from a "civil" commitment for the
same conduct. While these standards by no means approve of such
provisions, if they are to be used at all, further criminal proceedings
should at least count the time the offender has been civilly restrained
for the same underlying conduct. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation
Act of 1966 recognizes this principle by giving credit for any period of
civil commitment for addiction against any criminal confinement based
on the same conduct if criminal proceedings follow the civil commitment.27
Detention Under a Prior Invalid Sentence
Paragraph (b) addresses the resentencing situation where a prior conviction or sentence has been held invalid. Historically, some cases once
took the position that such confinement could be ignored since there
was no legal sentence of which the law had to take note.2* The reductio
adabsurdum consequences of this line of reasoning were effectively ridiculed in a classic statement in King v. United States:
The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that
because thefirstsentence was void appellant "has served no sentence but
has merely spent time in the penitentiary"; that since he should not have
been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all. . . . As other
27. See 23 U.S.C §2903(d) (1976).
28. See Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913).
18 • 316

ADDENDUM C

§7.09

122

Model Penal Code

Resubmitted to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 and
approved at the May 1961 meeting.
In the first sentence of Subsection (1) the words "convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor" have been added.
For Commentary, see Tentative Draft No. 2, p. 56.

Section 7.09. Credit for Time of Detention Prior to Sentence; Credit for Imprisonment Under
Earlier Sentence for the Same Crime.
(1) When a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment has previously been detained in any state or local correctional or other institution following his [conviction of]
[arrest for] the crime for which such sentence is imposed,
such period of detention following his [conviction] [arrest]
shall be deducted from the maximum term, and from the
minimum, if any, of such sentence. The officer having custody of the defendant shall furnish a certificate to the Court
at the time of sentence, showing the length of such detention
of the defendant prior to sentence in any state or local correctional or other institution, and the certificate shall be
annexed to the official records of the defendant's commitment.
i
(2) When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a
new sentence is thereafter imposed upon the defendant for
the same crime, the period of detention and imprisonment
theretofore served shall be deducted from the maximum
term, and from the minimum, if any, of the new sentence.
The officer having custody of the defendant shall furnish a
certificate to the Court at the time of sentence, showing
the period of imprisonment served under the original sentence, and the certificate shall be annexed to the official
records of the defendant's new commitment.
STATUS O t SECTION
Presented to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 and
approved at the May 1961 meeting.
A verbal change has been made in the title of the Section.

